Quartermasters can also fight the devils

Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, always believed that the only way for the Japanese army to resolve the Chinese battlefield was to have a decisive battle. For this reason, in 1942, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, submitted Operation No. 5 to attack from Xi'an and enter Sichuan Province. Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, believed that this could force the Chinese government to fight the Japanese army.

However, the so-called Operation Plan No. 5 previously formulated by Lieutenant General Yasuji Okamura, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, required the China Expeditionary Army to concentrate at least 400,000 troops and more than a year.

Therefore, the so-called Operation Plan No. 5 submitted by Lieutenant General Yasuji Okamura, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, was rejected without hesitation by Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters. The reason was that the security situation in North China was very serious, and the China Expeditionary Army could not mobilize 400,000 people to implement the Operation Plan No. 5 formulated by Lieutenant General Yasuji Okamura, commander of the North China Front Army.

At that time, the commander of the North China Front Army of the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, was very angry. At the same time, in his mind, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, the commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, and the Japanese Army Headquarters were regarded as mediocre people who knew nothing.

Therefore, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, was very angry and felt that his talents could not be brought into play under the leadership of this group of mediocre people. Therefore, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, ordered the Japanese North China Front Army troops to start encirclement and suppression of the Chinese guerrilla forces in North China in 1942.

In the view of Lieutenant General Yasuji Okamura, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, you mediocre people have used the excuse of the serious security situation in North China to veto the combat plan I submitted. Well, then I will improve the security in North China, and then we will see what excuses you mediocre people have to veto my proposal.

Therefore, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, commanded his troops to launch a large-scale mopping-up operation in North China. Under this large-scale mopping-up operation of the Japanese North China Front Army, the Chinese guerrilla forces in North China suffered heavy losses.

More than half of the original activity areas of the Hua Xia guerrilla forces in North China were occupied by the Japanese army. The guerrilla forces also lost one-third of their troops in the mopping-up operations of the Japanese North China Front Army. Even the army group's chief of staff, Zuo Quan, died heroically in this mopping-up operation.

After this large-scale mopping-up operation by the Japanese army in North China, the Japanese North China Front Army had basically reached a tacit understanding with the Chinese guerrilla forces in North China not to attack each other. From 1943 onwards, the Chinese guerrilla forces in North China no longer launched any large-scale offensive against the Japanese army, and the Japanese North China Front Army also stopped its large-scale mopping-up of the Chinese guerrilla forces in North China.

Lieutenant General Yasuji Okamura, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, had finally managed to significantly improve public security in North China through this large-scale mopping-up operation. He could also draw out some troops from his North China Front Army to be used in the so-called Battle No. 5 that he had previously planned. As a result, the Japanese military headquarters transferred a large number of Japanese troops from the North China Front Army to the south to the Pacific battlefield.

In early 1943 alone, four divisions of the Japanese North China Front Army were transferred away. The commander of the North China Front Army, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, was forced to upgrade the original four independent mixed brigades into divisions to make up the numbers. But the strength of the North China Front Army had actually been reduced by more than 50,000 people. However, the Japanese headquarters subsequently transferred several divisions from the North China Front Army, which made the commander of the North China Front Army, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, complain bitterly, because these troops were all the troops he had originally planned to use to implement Operation Plan No. 5.

As a result, the Japanese North China Front Army has abandoned a large number of existing strongholds due to the sharp reduction in its troop strength, and the important strongholds that cannot be abandoned have also been taken over by the puppet army. As of now, the total strength of the North China Front Army is only 125 battalions, which is more than 100,000 people.

Moreover, in addition to military operations, the Japanese army in North China was responsible for the important task of fighting to support the war. The Japanese army collected important materials such as grain, cotton, coal, salt, iron ore, etc. in North China, all of which required a minimum of military escort and protection.

Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, believed that the current strength of the Japanese North China Expeditionary Army was far below the minimum level required for normal operations. The existing strength of the North China Front Army was extremely empty, and even daily normal patrols were difficult. It was impossible to launch any active offensive, and it was impossible to withdraw a single soldier to implement the combat plan formulated by Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army.

Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, also stated in a telegram that the Japanese North China Front Army was simply unable to mobilize three divisions of troops to attack the Chinese government's First War Zone and open up the southern section of the Pinghan Railway Line.

Besides, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, believed that the Chinese government's First War Zone currently had at least 200,000 troops, and at least 80,000 of them were relatively combat-effective Chinese government troops. Even if he drew out three divisions of troops to implement this combat plan, he might not be able to achieve his combat objectives.

Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, knew that Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, was competing with him. He had rejected the Operation No. 5 plan submitted by the commander last time, and now the commander had rejected his operation plan by saying that the troops were insufficient to support the operation plan. This matter really left Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, helpless.

The commander of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, had no place to transfer more than three divisions to the commander of the North China Front Army, Lieutenant General Yasuji Okamura. Now the Japanese headquarters was still thinking about withdrawing troops from the China battlefield to make up for the losses in the Pacific battlefield. Where could he get three divisions?

However, it is understandable that the commander of the North China Front Army, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, ignored his combat requests. But why are you, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadanabe, the commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, creating troubles for yourself? Is it so difficult for you to transfer a division of troops to the 11th Army to participate in the war?

Therefore, the already angry commander of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, directly ordered the Chief of Staff of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Matsui Taikuro, to go to the headquarters of the Japanese 13th Army in Shanghai in person to give his orders to the commander of the Japanese 13th Army, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadana, and the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Kinoshita Isamu.