Quartermasters can also fight the devils

In the headquarters of the 13th Japanese Army in Shanghai, Lieutenant General Taikuro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Sadakawa Shimomura, Commander of the 13th Japanese Army, and Lieutenant General Isamu Kinoshita, Chief of Staff, exchanged pleasantries and then went straight to the topic of their visit.

Lieutenant General Taijiro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, first emphasized to Lieutenant General Sadada Shimomura, Commander of the Japanese 13th Army, and Lieutenant General Isamu Kinoshita, Chief of Staff, that the offensive was the largest offensive operation of the China Expeditionary Army at present, and all forces must be concentrated.

Then, Lieutenant General Taijiro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, explained why troops could not be withdrawn from the North China Front Army to participate in the Battle of Changde. This was because the 36th Division of the Japanese Army of the North China Front Army would go to the Pacific battlefield to fight at the end of September. The North China Front Army was now extremely short of troops. Therefore, the China Expeditionary Army could only withdraw troops from the 13th Army to the 11th Army to participate in the Battle of Changde.

Finally, Lieutenant General Taijiro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, changed the subject and said that in order to make up for the current troop gap of the Japanese 11th Army, the Japanese 13th Army needed to at least transfer out six battalions to form a detachment and hand it over to the Japanese 11th Army to command the operations.

Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadanabe, commander of the 13th Japanese Army, and Lieutenant General Kinoshita Isamu, chief of staff, knew that this time, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, had given them great respect by sending Lieutenant General Matsui Taikuro, chief of the general staff, to explain the situation to them. So, although the two were still a little reluctant, they could not say anything in front of Lieutenant General Matsui Taikuro, chief of the general staff of the China Expeditionary Army. They could only say that they would study as soon as possible where to draw six battalions of troops from.

Lieutenant General Taijiro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army, was relieved when he saw that Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadana, Commander of the 13th Japanese Army, and Lieutenant General Kinoshita Isamu, Chief of Staff, had given in. He also knew that the Japanese Army was in a shortage of troops in various parts of China, and the possibility of Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, Commander of the 11th Japanese Army, wanting to directly send a regular division to participate in the war was relatively small. Therefore, in order to take care of the situation of the 13th Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Taijiro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army, specifically proposed that only six battalions of troops would be enough. This could be considered a way to smooth things over.

So, seeing that the matter had been settled, Lieutenant General Taijiro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army, happily returned to the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters in Nanjing to report to Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, Commander of the China Expeditionary Army.

Two days later, a telegram from Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadama, commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, was sent to the headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army. In the telegram, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadama, commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, made a formal reply that he could provide a detachment of troops to reinforce the operations of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army. However, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadama, commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, stated that this detachment supporting the operations of the 11th Army had only three battalions of troops, and each battalion had only three squadrons. This was equivalent to more than a 50% discount on the troop withdrawal plan proposed by Lieutenant General Taikuro Matsui, Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army.

Faced with the Japanese 13th Army's carefully calculated bargaining plan, the commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, lost his patience. If he continued to bargain with the commander of the Japanese 13th Army, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadanabe, the Battle of Changde might not be able to be fought next year.

Therefore, Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, directly ordered the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters to send a telegram to the 13th General of the Japanese Army, ordering the 13th Army of the Japanese Army to withdraw six main battalions from the 116th Division of the Japanese Army in the formal name of a direct order. In addition, the 13th Army of the Japanese Army needed to withdraw three battalions from the 65th Division of the Japanese Army to form the Ereda Detachment, which would arrive in the three towns before the end of November to participate in the attack on Changde.

Now, when the commander of the 13th Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadana, saw that the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters had issued a dispatch order in an absolutely serious and formal tone, he had no choice but to follow the order of the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters and begin to draw troops and send them to accept the direct command of Lieutenant General Yokoyama Isamu, commander of the 11th Japanese Army.

Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, was also unhappy with the Chinese Expeditionary Force's attempt to smooth things over. He wanted a proper division, but you put together half a division's worth of troops for him. Should he be grateful or cursed?

Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, also knew that the Chinese Expeditionary Force would not be able to dispatch troops to him in a short period of time. Since there was no hope for external support, he could only continue to tap his internal potential.

Therefore, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, could only shift his attention back to his own 11th Army, and ordered the 11th Army Headquarters of the Japanese Army to fully mobilize all divisions and brigades, and to gather a large number of troops by robbing Peter to pay Paul, thus forming an absolute advantage in offensive force.

The specific deployment of Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, was that the 39th Division of the Japanese Army, originally stationed in Dangyang, was assembled west of Jingzhou, and the 58th Division of the Japanese Army drew three battalions of troops to form the Koga Detachment, which was assigned to the 13th Division of the Japanese Army to assist in the operation.

The 13th Division of the Japanese Army, which was originally stationed in Jingzhou, was concentrated on the line from Jingzhou to Shashi. The 17th Mixed Brigade of the Japanese Army stationed in Yueyang drew out two battalions of troops to form the Miyawaki Detachment, which was assigned to the 13th Division of the Japanese Army to assist in combat.

The elite Japanese 3rd Division, as the main attacking force of the Japanese 11th Army, assembled in Haoxue Town. Three regiments were drawn from the Japanese 34th Division stationed in Hongcheng to form the Sasaki Detachment. The Sasaki Detachment was organized at the division level and was assigned to the Japanese 3rd Division for combat.

The six battalions of the 234th Division of the Japanese Army, which were drawn from the th Army of the Japanese Army, were assembled north of Shishou. The th Division of the Japanese Army, which was originally stationed in Jiujiang, drew six battalions of troops and assembled them on the Jianli front line. The th Division of the Japanese Army drew the th Regiment and formed the Toda Detachment to cooperate with the th Division in combat.

The Erada Detachment, formed from three battalions drawn from the 65th Division of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, served as the reserve force for the entire battle.

At this point, the Japanese 11th Army had actually assembled a total of six divisions and four detachments for the Battle of Changde. The division-level combat units that served as the main attack were basically fully equipped with artillery, cavalry, engineers, and logistics regiments, while the temporarily formed detachments were responsible for flank cover after the front line moved forward, and were mainly composed of infantry.