Quartermasters can also fight the devils

As the battle plan of the Japanese 11th Army's Changde Campaign was finalized, the participating units of the Japanese 11th Army were also preparing to begin their assembly operations. The commander of the Japanese 11th Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, planned that by late October, the Japanese 39th Division, the Japanese 13th Division, the Japanese 3rd Division, the Japanese 116th Division, the Japanese 68th Division and part of the Japanese 58th Division, a total of more than 100,000 troops assembled by the Japanese 11th Army for the Changde Campaign would be assembled in Huarong, Shishou, Ou Chi, Shashi, Jiangling and other areas.

Among them, the 116th Division of the Japanese Army was transferred from the combat sequence of the neighboring 13th Army of the Japanese Army after the commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, specifically applied to the China Expeditionary Army.

In order to fight the Battle of Changde perfectly, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, racked his brains. Not only did he prepare to adopt the tactic of feinting to the east and attacking in the west again in the battle plan, but in order to ensure the intensity and speed of the attack, he also pulled out all the troops that could be mobilized by his 11th Army.

However, no matter how much the commander of the 11th Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, and the staff of the 11th Japanese Army Headquarters calculated, they just could not gather the combat forces needed to complete the Changde combat plan. After all, no matter how good the strategy is, it must be matched with the military resources to complete the strategy, otherwise, everything is just empty talk.

However, the Japanese 11th Army could no longer mobilize so many troops to carry out this combat plan. In order to cope with the operations on the Taiping battlefield, the Japanese headquarters had already transferred the two main combat divisions of the Japanese 11th Army to the Pacific battlefield. Where could they get the troops now?

However, this problem did not pose a problem for the clever Japanese 11th Army Commander Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama. For him, just because his 11th Army could not produce any results did not mean that other armies could not produce any results. When the battle plan for the Battle of Changde was formulated, Japanese 11th Army Commander Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama knew that his 11th Army would not be able to mobilize enough troops to complete the battle plan.

Therefore, the commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, had already set his sights on the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, which was closest to his 11th Army. Moreover, the commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, had already identified the troops he needed, which was the main force of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, the 116th Division.

Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, also telegraphed the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters requesting an increase in troop strength. Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, also knew the significance of the Battle of Changde, so he sent a telegram to Lieutenant General Sadamara Shimomura, commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, who had just taken office, requesting Lieutenant General Sadamara Shimomura to transfer the 116th Division of the Japanese Army and put it under the command of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army to participate in the Battle of Changde.

After receiving the telegram from Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadanabe, commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, jumped up from his 13th Army headquarters in Shanghai. You know, the 116th Division of the Japanese Army is the main combat division of his 13th Army.

If the 116th Division was transferred to the 11th Army, what would happen to the 13th Army's combat mission? You know, the Chinese Expeditionary Force also let its 13th Army attack Guangde. Most of its 13th Army were garrison divisions, and it was planning to use the 116th Division as the main force to fight in Guangde.

Besides, the 13th Army of the Japanese Army guarded a vast occupied area in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, and the front line was quite long. The troops available for the Guangde operation were already stretched to the limit. After the only reserve 116th Division was transferred away, not to mention if any emergency situation occurred that could not be handled, just where would the commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadanabe, find troops to fill the huge hole on the front line?

Therefore, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadama, commander of the 13th Army of the Japanese Army, felt that it was absolutely impossible to transfer a proper field main division of his 13th Army, but it was still possible to transfer an infantry battalion to Lieutenant General Yokoyama Isamu, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army.

Therefore, after careful calculations, Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadanabe, commander of the Japanese 13th Army, sent a reply to Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, claiming that his 13th Army had heavy combat tasks and could not allocate the 116th Division to support the 11th Army in the Changde Campaign.

After receiving a reply from Lieutenant General Shimomura Sadanabe, commander of the Japanese 13th Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, was extremely depressed, because he had just received a telegram from Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Chinese North China Front Army.

In the original operational plan of the "Outline of Operational Guidance for the China Expeditionary Army after the Autumn of 1939" formulated by the Commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, the first targets targeted by the Commander of the China Expeditionary Army were the Sixth War Zone and the First War Zone, which were the most powerful units of the China government army.

The plan in the operational outline of Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Army, was that in the second half of 1943, local offensive operations must be carried out on the two war zones of the Chinese government to continuously consume the strength of the Chinese government's army.

According to the combat plan formulated by Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, the attack on the Chinese government's Sixth War Zone and First War Zone should begin successively in the second half of the year.

Among them, the main purpose of the First War Zone in attacking the Chinese government was to open up the southern section of the Pinghan Railway. This required the North China Front Army to dispatch at least three divisions to cooperate with the Japanese 11th Army in central China to attack and fight together.

What the commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, did not expect was that the commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, firmly opposed the plan he had formulated.

In fact, the commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, has always been very disdainful of the military command ability of the commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku. In the eyes of Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku and the senior officials of the Japanese invading China headquarters are a bunch of mediocre people with no strategic-level command and combat capabilities. They can only handle some routine matters and insignificant local battles. It is simply difficult for them to control the overall situation of the entire China battlefield.

Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji, commander of the Japanese North China Front Army, believed that the current situation on the Chinese battlefield had deteriorated to such a difficult point entirely due to the lack of strategic foresight by the top brass of the China Expeditionary Army Command and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters.

(Thanks to Gong Yan who loves to eat blood glutinous rice, and eats dumplings without vinegar for the gift support! Thank you all for your support and encouragement!)