Quartermasters can also fight the devils

However, the situation of the Japanese army in the Pacific battlefield did not improve with the transfer of materials from Japan to the mainland. Instead, under the comprehensive counterattack of the United States' navy and air force, the Japanese army was forced to switch from the previous offensive to a comprehensive defensive position. As the Japanese army switched to a defensive position in the Pacific battlefield, the Allied forces in the India-Burma theater were also planning to counterattack Burma. While driving the Japanese army out of Southeast Asia, they also completely opened up China's road supply lines.

This very obvious idea of ​​the Allied Forces was also seen very clearly by the Japanese military headquarters. In order to support the Japanese operations in the Pacific battlefield and the India-Burma battlefield, the Japanese military headquarters tied down the Chinese government's troops and transferred them from Sichuan and Hunan provinces to Yunnan Province and India to participate in the operations in Burma.

Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Army, put forward his opinion to the Japanese military headquarters, that is, it is necessary to cut off the connection between the Yamashiro Chinese government and Britain and the United States. In order to achieve this goal, there is no other way except to use force.

The proposal of Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, was strongly endorsed by Lieutenant General Sugiyama Hajime, who had just taken office as Chief of the Japanese General Staff. Lieutenant General Sugiyama Hajime also believed that the only important strategy to resolve the war in China most quickly was to launch an offensive against the Chinese government and fight their way out.

In August 1943, as the situation of the Japanese army in the Pacific battlefield became increasingly bad, the Chief of the Japanese General Staff, Lieutenant General Sugiyama Hajime, personally came to Nanjing, the headquarters of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, and conveyed the order of the Japanese headquarters to the commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, demanding the complete elimination of the Chinese government, severing the ties between the Chinese government and Britain and the United States, and ending the war in China.

In accordance with the instructions of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, conducted a careful analysis and study of the current overall war situation of the Japanese Army, especially the counterattack that the Allied forces in Burma may launch at any time, the support of the Chinese army at that time, and the continuous strengthening trend of the United States Air Force stationed in China, combined with the current situation of the China Expeditionary Army.

After more than half a month of discussion and research by Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the Japanese China Expeditionary Army, and all the bigwigs of the Japanese Expeditionary Army Headquarters, the China Expeditionary Army Headquarters finally finalized the "Outline of Operational Guidance for the China Expeditionary Army after the Autumn of Showa 18" on August 28th.

The combat strategy formulated by Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, was: The Japanese China Expeditionary Army needed to work hard to ensure and pacify the public security issues in the existing occupied areas, especially the increasingly severe public security situation in North China. In the autumn of 1943, the main forces of the Japanese 11th Army and the Japanese 13th Army would carry out the Changde Operation and the Guangde Operation respectively. After successfully completing these two combat missions, they would wait until the spring of 1944 to carry out the operation to open up the Beijing-Hankou Railway Line with the North China Front Army and the Japanese 11th Army.

When Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, submitted this combat strategy to the Japanese military headquarters for review, the bigwigs of the Japanese military headquarters agreed to the combat plan to attack Changde formulated by Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, based on the current situation on the battlefield.

The senior executives of the Japanese military headquarters unanimously believed that Hunan Province was the grain production area that the Chinese government in the mountain city currently relied on, and Changde was the military, political and economic center of the western region of Hunan Province. Relying on Changsha in the east, it was the lifeline of supply for the Chinese army in the mountain city.

If the 11th Army of the Chinese Expeditionary Force can occupy Changde, it can monitor Changsha and Hengyang to the southeast and threaten the eastern part of Sichuan Province to the west, becoming a strategic point that can threaten the Chinese government in the mountain city and a very suitable target for attack.

At the same time, the Japanese military headquarters also planned to regain the face lost in the Pacific battlefield during this period from the Chinese government. After all, the Japanese army was suppressed by the American army in all aspects in the Pacific battlefield during this period, and they suffered one defeat after another. Now they urgently need a victory to boost the morale of the army and the people at home.

If the Japanese military headquarters wanted to realize their idea of ​​using victory to boost morale, the weak Chinese government army would naturally be the best choice. As for the American army on the Pacific battlefield, forget it. If they could defeat the American army, there would be no need to do anything to boost morale.

After receiving the combat order from Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Yokoyama Isamu, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, also ordered the 11th Army Command of the Japanese Army to formulate a combat plan to attack Changde in accordance with the requirements of Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army.

The commander of the 11th Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, was very welcoming to the combat instructions of the commander of the China Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku. Since the end of the Battle of Western Hubei, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama had been thinking about how to avenge the defeat at the last moment of the Battle of Western Hubei for the past three months.

This combat order issued by the Japanese Imperial Headquarters and the China Expeditionary Force just met the wishes of Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army. Moreover, during this period, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, had already organized the combat staff of the 11th Army Headquarters to study the possibility of attacking Changde.

In order to ensure the success of this battle, the Japanese 11th Army Commander Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama summoned all the chiefs of staff of the participating units in the battle plan to the three towns on October 6th, and conducted map work on the Changde battle plan formulated by the Japanese 11th Army Command. It can be said that the preparations were quite thorough.

The Changde Campaign plan finally determined by the Japanese 11th Army Command was still divided into three stages. The main content and policy of this Changde Campaign was to first annihilate the Chinese government troops near Anxiang, and then use the main force to eliminate the Chinese government troops in the area around Wangjiachang. In this way, the city of Changde could be successfully captured. At the same time, while pursuing the Chinese troops, we must always be prepared to strike at the Chinese troops that were gathering for a counterattack, and surround and destroy the main forces of the Chinese government on the way to the counterattack.

Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Japanese Army, also learned from the problems in the previous Battle of Western Hubei and several Changsha battles. He anticipated and prepared for the counterattack of the Chinese army in advance, and was ready to use the combat method that the Chinese army had become accustomed to to completely destroy the counterattack army of the Chinese government.