Dragon in the Rivers and Lakes: I, Wei Jixiang, Change My Fate Against Heaven

In the 20s, the two major camps of the East and the West were in a state of confrontation, and there were three main political forces in the political life of the Javanese state: President Sukarno, the Javanese military, and the Javanese Communist Party.

President Sukarno has always stood at the forefront of the Third World's fight against imperialism and colonialism, advocated unity and cooperation among the "emerging forces", initiated and led the Non-Aligned Movement, and visited Dragon three times.

The political force that Sukarno relied on was the Java Communist Party. He once said: "I am a friend of the Communists because the Communists are revolutionaries." At that time, the Java Communist Party was a large party outside of China and the Soviet Union with 300 million members and a strong mass base.

Sukarno even considered handing over state power to the Communist Party after his death.

Sukarno's political inclinations caused dissatisfaction among some pro-American senior generals within the military, such as Army Chief of Staff Yani and Defense Minister Nasution.

亲美将领们成立了“将领委员会“，在1965年9月21日的一次会议上还秘密组成新的内阁，策划1965年10月5日建军节时发动推翻总统的政变然而总统卫队长翁东中校抢先行动了。

At 9 p.m. on September 30, seven trucks filled with armed soldiers in presidential guard uniforms set out from the Halim Air Force Base and arrived in Jakarta in the early morning of the next day. They then went to the residences of seven army generals to conduct searches.

As a result, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Yani, Lieutenant General Pandjaitan and Major General Haryono were killed, Major General Supraputo, Major General Perman and Brigadier General Sudojo were kidnapped to Halim Air Force Base and later killed. Only General Nasution escaped over the wall.

Beforehand, Ungdon had sent people twice to meet with General Suharto, who was in charge of the powerful Army Strategic Reserve at the time, to report the situation to him, but Suharto remained inactive.

On the morning of October 1965, 10, Ungtong issued a national announcement, claiming that the purpose of the incident was to protect Sukarno from the control of army generals supported by the CIA.

In the afternoon, Suharto convened a meeting of the General Staff, saying that Ongdong and others "launched a coup and used violent means to usurp state power. These were definitely planned by the Java Communist Party." The meeting decided that he would be in charge of the counterattack.

The next day Suharto rejected Sukarno's call for a political solution to the crisis and forced Sukarno to appoint him as minister in charge of restoring security and public order and commander of the army.

The army soon captured the Harlem Air Force Base and the "September 9 Movement" ended in failure.

Supporters of Sukarno and Suharto have different opinions on the truth behind the "September 9" coup.

So is the Javanese Communist Party related to the "Ondong Coup"? According to the CIA report, the leader of the Javanese Communist Party, Aidit, clearly stated at a meeting on August 1965, 8: "The question now is, should the Javanese Communist Party wait for the president's death and allow itself to suffer a sudden blow, or take the initiative to thwart the army's actions and attacks? I am more inclined to take action first."

The CIA concluded that "the Javanese Communist Party played a central role in planning the coup d'état and that there was irrefutable evidence that all the major decisions were made by the Javanese Communist Party."

However, after the incident, the general secretary of the Java Communist Party, Aidit, instructed party organizations at all levels: Do not hold demonstrations in support of the "September 9" movement, declare that those are internal affairs of the army and have nothing to do with the Java Communist Party, and express full support for any solution announced by Sukarno.

After that, Ai Di was forced to go underground, but he was unexpectedly betrayed by an Army Intelligence Service agent among his personal guards and was killed.

To date, more and more declassified information shows that the United States played a very disgraceful role behind this massacre.

Documents show that just four days after the coup, the then United States ambassador to Java, Marshall Green, expressed the hope that the military would take advantage of the killing of six generals on September 1965, 9, to accuse the Javanese Communist Party of conspiring to seize power and control Java.

Although Green was unsure whether the Javanese Communists were involved, he stressed the need for the army to act decisively in a cable to Washington on October 1965, 10: "Whatever the background ... the army controls the situation and has important instruments of power such as newspapers, radio, television, etc.

It also has information about the killings of six senior generals, which the army can exploit if it wants to.

It has already begun to do so...Except for the Javanese Communists and their followers, the Muslim groups and others are on the side of the army...If it moves quickly, the army now has a great opportunity to defeat the Javanese Communists...The discovery of the body of the murdered general has brought the above momentum to a climax. In short, the opportunity is now or never... "

In another October 1965, 10, cable to the U.S. intelligence community, Greene stressed the need for further anti-communist propaganda: "Link the present terrorist incident to the kidnapping and murder of high-ranking generals with the North Vietnamese killing of village chiefs in South Vietnamese villages by repeating the facts in all media."

Two days later, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, Bundy, met with a diplomatic delegation from the Kangaroo State to discuss the situation in Java and the strategy that the army should adopt.

Subsequently, large-scale anti-communist bloodshed occurred in North Sumatra Province. A local Muslim youth organization with ties to the military searched for and massacred the leaders of the Communist Youth Organization. They also began to attack Chinese communists in Medan and other North Sumatra cities. A large number of Chinese were beaten and their houses and shops were burned.

In Aceh province, Muslim fanatics attacked almost all local communists, and some Aceh thugs even killed people and hung their heads on poles on both sides of the road.

During the anti-communist campaign, the military also targeted Sukarno's presidential power.

On March 1966, 3, three generals came to Sukarno's Bogor Palace and forced Sukarno to sign the so-called "March 11 Order" to transfer administrative power to Suharto.

On March 1967, 3, the military-controlled Provisional People's Consultative Conference unanimously voted to revoke the appointment of President Sukarno and deprive him of all powers.

Suharto also began his iron-fisted rule over Java that lasted for more than 30 years.

The 1965 massacre brought Suharto to the pinnacle of power in Java. Under the international situation at the time, being pro-American and anti-communist became a quick way for him to realize the identity of the Javanese nation internally and enhance his international status externally. At that time, the Dragon Kingdom was in a special period.

The Javanese military viewed mainland China as the backer of the Javanese Communist Party, and therefore the blame for the "September 9" incident was shifted to the Chinese.

During this period, the Javanese military falsely claimed that nine Dayak (Indonesian mountain indigenous people) elders were killed by the Chinese, in an attempt to incite hatred among the Dayak people against the Chinese.

The Daya people, eager for revenge, placed red earthen bowls filled with chicken or dog blood in front of many Chinese residences.

This is the sign of Daya people's revenge.

The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States once called this tragedy "the worst mass murder of the 20th century", but there is no exact data on the exact number of casualties to date.

According to a later CIA investigation report, a large number of Chinese were massacred by April 1966. The exact number cannot be verified.