Quartermasters can also fight the devils

The so-called unclear strategic goal lies in the fact that the offensive forces of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army actually had some opportunities to achieve greater results in the Battle of Changde. For example, after the offensive forces of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army defeated the defense line of the 29th Army of the Chinese Government near the Lishui River, if the troops of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army continued to pursue the collapsed 29th Army of the Chinese Government, it is very likely that most of the troops of the 29th Army of the Chinese Government would be destroyed.

However, the attacking force of the 11th Japanese Army and its commander, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, made the same mistake they had made in previous battles. They focused too much on capturing the city, gave up their dream of pursuing the 29th Army of the Chinese government, and instead rushed directly to Changde.

Although the attacking forces of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army surrounded the 57th Division of the Chinese Government in Changde in a very short time, the entire 57th Division of the Chinese Government had only 8,500 troops. Even if all of them were wiped out by the attacking forces of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, it would not be enough to cause any serious damage to the troops of the Sixth War Zone of the Chinese Government.

If this happened in the early stages of the war between Japan and China, when the Japanese army occupied cities in order to gain control of them, it would be understandable. However, the pre-war combat plan for the Battle of Changde had already clearly stated that the offensive force of the Japanese 11th Army would immediately abandon the plan after occupying Changde, which made it meaningless for the offensive force of the Japanese 11th Army to continue to fight desperately to occupy Changde.

As for the casualties of the Japanese 11th Army in the Battle of Changde, they were quite large, and far exceeded the estimate of the commander of the Japanese 11th Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, before the Battle of Changde. You should know that in the Battle of Changde, the casualties of officers and soldiers of the Japanese 11th Army were as high as more than 20,000, which was about 30% of the strength of the Japanese 11th Army participating in the Battle of Changde. This is already a very high loss ratio.

Moreover, the number of casualties among senior officers of the Japanese 11th Army was also heavy. Those killed by the Chinese army alone included Colonel Teru Fukami, commander of the 109th Regiment, Colonel Mamoru Nakahata, commander of the 6th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Kaneo Suzuki, acting commander of the 109th Regiment, Major Nagashimamura Nagahira, commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 109th Regiment, Major Nagano Kuro, commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 120th Regiment, and Major Wakiya, commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 133rd Regiment. In addition, another regiment commander was injured, and several battalion commanders were slightly or even seriously injured.

Of course, the casualty figures announced by the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the China Expeditionary Force and the 11th Army of the Japanese Army after the war were only more than 4,100 people. However, anyone can see that the Japanese Army is talking nonsense in this casualty report. If the attacking force of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army really had only so few casualties, then there would be no need for the 11th Army of the Japanese Army to withdraw from the Changde area.

Moreover, although the Japanese army's replenishment capacity is much stronger than that of the Chinese army, with the Japanese army's use of troops in the Pacific and Southeast Asian battlefields, the current replenishment speed of the troops is far less rapid and less quality than in the early days of the War of Resistance. The more than 20,000 casualties of the Japanese 11th Army in the Battle of Changde are equivalent to a complete Japanese Type A division. For the current Japanese army, it is also difficult to replenish. This is also the reason why the subsequent Battle of Henan, Hunan and Guangxi did not break out until half a year later, because the replenishment of the Japanese army also takes time.

As for giving up this point after occupying Changde, it well highlights the fact that the Japanese army is currently strong on the outside but weak on the inside. In order to undermine the strategic offensive momentum of the Chinese army, the Japanese troops on the Chinese battlefield must use offense instead of defense, give full play to the current advantages of the Japanese army in combat effectiveness and weapons firepower, and actively attack the Chinese army.

However, as the war continued, the problem of resource scarcity in Japan became increasingly prominent. Moreover, as the Japanese army expanded the war to large areas of the Pacific and Southeast Asia, all kinds of supplies became even more scarce. This forced the Japanese offensive forces to adopt a short-term fight and hit-and-run mode in this type of combat, making it impossible for them to sustain combat for a long time.

In the later stages of the Changde Campaign, the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army had actually fallen into a complete defeat. If these offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army continued to fight the Chinese army in the Changde area for another half a month, the remaining 70,000 troops of the Japanese 11th Army would definitely be severely damaged by the Chinese army.

Therefore, after occupying Changde, the attacking force of the 11th Japanese Army was unable to continue to defend Changde in the face of the Chinese army besieging from all sides. It had to abandon Changde and quickly withdraw to the original defense zone to avoid greater losses. This was also the fundamental reason why Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Japanese Army, violated the order issued by Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, to defend Changde!

In fact, the Changde Campaign launched by the Japanese Imperial Headquarters and the Chinese Expeditionary Force was meaningless, because this battle could not change the inevitable outcome of Japan's defeat. This kind of fighting could only lead to mutual consumption between China and Japan, and make the Japanese army sink deeper and deeper on the Chinese battlefield.

Therefore, in general, the battle between the Japanese and Chinese armies in the Battle of Changde should actually be considered a draw, with both sides suffering heavy losses.

The New 22nd Army, which was originally intercepted in Guizhou Province by the Military Commission at the beginning of the Changde Campaign, was surrounded by the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army in Changde. As the reinforcements organized by the Ninth War Zone of the Chinese government had already set off and at the request of Commander Chen, the commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, the Military Commission of the Chinese government ordered the New 22nd Army to continue to set off from Guizhou Province and rush to the designated assembly area in Yunnan Province.

Moreover, the Military Commission of the Chinese government also knew that it would be too late for the troops of the New 22nd Army to rush to Changde from the mountains and hills of Guizhou Province. It would take at least 20 days for the troops of the New 22nd Army to reach Changde, by which time the opportunity would have been lost.

The reason why the Military Commission of the Chinese government intercepted the New 22nd Army that had already reached Guizhou Province at that time was because it was afraid that the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army would continue to attack westwards and bypass Guizhou Province to attack the mountain city. However, the Chinese government now has only a few newly formed reserve divisions in Guizhou Province that are being organized and trained. If the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army attack westwards from Changde, the Chinese government will have no troops to stop the advance of the Japanese 11th Army.

However, as the Japanese 11th Army's attack target became clear and the reinforcement troops organized by the Ninth War Zone of the Chinese government set out, the Chinese government's Military Commission put aside the battle of the new 22nd Army to reinforce the Changde area.