Quartermasters can also fight the devils

During the second phase of operations launched by the Japanese 11th Army, Commander Sun, acting commander of the Sixth War Zone of the Chinese government, used the Lishui line to continue to consume the strength of the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army, and mobilized the troops of the 74th Army and the 100th Army to begin to defend the Changde line, preparing for a fierce battle with the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army.

While the Japanese 11th Army was fighting in the third phase, General Sun, acting commander of the Chinese government's Sixth War Zone, mobilized the main forces of the Chinese government's Sixth War Zone and Ninth War Zone to fight a decisive battle with the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army near Changde, and defeated all the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army in one fell swoop.

So, in general, the Battle of Changde was carried out in accordance with the combat plan formulated by Commander Sun, acting commander of the Sixth War Zone of the Chinese government. The final result was to defeat the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army and recover the areas occupied by the Japanese 11th Army in the early stage of the Battle of Changde.

The only mistake made by Commander Sun, acting commander of the Sixth War Zone of the Chinese government, in all his command of the Changde Campaign was that he misjudged the strength and fighting will of the 29th Army of the Chinese government that was defending the Lishui River. As a result, the 73rd Army of the 29th Army had poor combat effectiveness due to the chronic problems of the warlord troops, and the new recruits had no combat effectiveness at all. They were defeated in one blow by the offensive forces of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army. Not only did they abandon the Lishui defense line, but they also gave up the second and third lines of defense behind them, which led to the offensive forces of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army arriving near Changde City too smoothly.

The 44th Army of the 29th Army Group, because of the unique idea of ​​preserving strength of the Chinese local forces, was able to retreat without a fight under the attack of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army and gave up all the defense lines north of Changde.

The rapid defeat of the 29th Army Group suddenly made the situation in the Changde Campaign tense, causing the army of the Sixth War Zone of the Chinese Government to fall into a passive position tactically. This was also the fundamental reason why the 57th Division was eventually annihilated after fighting hard for 16 days in Changde.

After the Battle of Changde, Wang Zanxu, commander-in-chief of the 29th Army Group of the Chinese government, Wang Zhibin, commander of the 73rd Army, and others were removed from their posts by the Military Commission of the Chinese government.

It was precisely because of this problem of the 29th Army that Changde, which was originally jointly defended by the 74th Army and the 100th Army, was finally defended by only the 57th Division, making Changde's defense very weak and it would sooner or later be occupied by the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army.

In addition, the 57th Division guarding Changde was surrounded, which disrupted the reinforcement plan of the Sixth and Ninth War Zones of the Chinese government. The Chinese army's reinforcement forces' original steady operations turned into an emergency rescue operation for Changde, causing the Chinese army's reinforcement forces to suffer casualties beyond pre-war expectations.

However, from the Military Commission of the Huaxia government to the Sixth War Zone Command of the Huaxia government, there were certain mistakes in the Battle of Changde.

In the last Battle of Western Hubei, the troops of the Sixth War Zone of the Chinese government annihilated more than 20,000 offensive troops of the Japanese 11th Army, while the casualties of the Chinese army were more than 40,000. Calculated in this way, the casualty ratio between the Japanese and Chinese armies was approximately one to two, which was also the normal ratio of casualties between the Japanese and Chinese armies in the middle period of the War of Resistance.

However, in this Battle of Changde, the casualties of the Chinese government's army were much greater than in the previous Battle of Western Hubei. The troops of the Chinese government's Sixth War Zone alone suffered more than 45,000 casualties, and the troops of the Chinese government's Ninth War Zone responsible for the rescue suffered more than 15,000 casualties. As a result, the total casualties of the Chinese army exceeded 60,000.

Although the casualties of the Japanese 11th Army in the Battle of Changde also reached more than 20,000 officers and soldiers, compared with the total casualties of the Chinese army, the casualty ratio between the Japanese and Chinese armies in the Battle of Changde was close to one to three. When calculated in this way, the casualty ratio of both sides in the previous Battle of Western Hubei is quite different.

There are many reasons why the Chinese army suffered so many casualties in the Battle of Changde, but fundamentally, it was because the 57th Division guarding Changde was heavily surrounded by the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army, forcing the Chinese army outside Changde to attack and rescue Changde at all costs.

Considering that the Chinese army's offensive weapon firepower was only one-fifth of that of the Japanese 11th Army's offensive forces, the huge casualties in the attack were understandable.

However, the Chinese army's ability to replenish troops was much worse than that of the Japanese army. This was because they suffered more than 60,000 casualties in the Battle of Changde, but their ability to recover their troops was far less than that of the Japanese army. Ultimately, after the outbreak of the Henan, Hunan and Guangxi Campaign half a year later, some troops in the Sixth and Ninth War Zones of the Chinese government still had not recovered their strength. For example, the Tenth Army of the Chinese government suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of Changde. Until the Battle of Hengyang, the Tenth Army was not able to fully replenish its troops, and there was a large shortage of troops. So, in this sense, the Chinese government’s Military Commission and the troops of the Sixth and Ninth War Zones of the Chinese government suffered too many casualties in the Battle of Changde, and the fight could not be considered good.

The 11th Army of the Japanese Army actually fought quite well in the Battle of Changde. You should know that the combat purpose before the war of Lieutenant General Shunroku Hata, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, and Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama, commander of the 11th Army of the Japanese Army, was simply to destroy the main force of the Sixth War Zone of the Chinese government, and then occupy Changde and then give up retreating.

In the Battle of Changde, the offensive forces of the Japanese 11th Army basically completed the combat objectives set before the war. Since neither Lieutenant General Hata Shunroku, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, nor Lieutenant General Yokoyama Isamu, commander of the Japanese 11th Army, had planned to completely occupy Changde for a long time in their combat plans before the start of the Changde Battle, then abandoning Changde under the siege of the Chinese army does not mean that the Japanese 11th Army was a complete failure.

Therefore, from the perspective of the Japanese headquarters, the expeditionary force and the 11th Army before the war, the Japanese 11th Army basically achieved its combat objectives in this Changde Campaign. However, the Japanese 11th Army also had some problems in this Changde Campaign. The main problems were unclear strategic goals, heavy casualties and inability to occupy Changde for a long time.