Quartermasters can also fight the devils

Therefore, the United States absolved Japan's Emperor Hirohito of responsibility for the war by arguing that the Japanese emperor had no authority.

It is particularly crucial to ask whether Japan's Emperor Hirohito had "no say" in the war, whether it had nothing to do with the "political decision of the Japanese government", and whether the "imperial power" of pre-war Japan was only symbolic as the United States believes.

In fact, if we look at Japan before the war, we have to say that the so-called "emperor has no power" is a very far-fetched judgment.

This is mainly because the United States did not take into account the characteristics of imperial power, because the United States itself is a country without an imperial history. The power of the President of the United States is the "power of the prime minister" who "oversees all officials and governs all affairs." If we look at imperial power from the standard of "power of the prime minister", there will naturally be considerable differences.

Before the surrender of the Japanese government, Emperor Hirohito of Japan was not a so-called figurehead as was said after the war. The first point is that Article 4 of Chapter 1 of Japan's Meiji Constitution clearly stipulates that "The Emperor of Japan is the head of state and holds overall ruling power."

In Chapter 1, Articles 5 to 17 of Japan's Meiji Constitution, it is clearly stated that these "ruling powers" include parliament, laws, officials, the military, declaring war and negotiating peace with foreign countries, martial law within the country, amnesty and commutation of sentences, etc., which are all the most important powers of the state.

The second point is that Emperor Hirohito of Japan did not just sign and seal these powers as some Japanese scholars said. Although Emperor Hirohito of Japan did not have a say on everything, he did have the highest say.

The third point is that Emperor Hirohito of Japan was actually very concerned about the progress of the war and participated in almost all major decisions of the Japanese government and military.

Therefore, whether the role of Emperor Hirohito of Japan before and during the war was just symbolic is actually not difficult to prove from Japan's system and historical facts. However, there is one thing that is difficult to prove, that is, how to prove that everything Emperor Hirohito of Japan did was out of his own initiative, rather than as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, General MacArthur, believed that Emperor Hirohito of Japan responded mechanically to all things. This is indeed difficult to confirm from Japan's system and public and private documents.

However, it was not until after the death of Emperor Hirohito of Japan that a collection of conversations called "Monologues of Emperor Showa" recorded by Terazaki Hidenari, who once served as the "official director" of the Imperial Palace of Japan, was published. The conversations recorded in the book were delivered by Terazaki Hidenari's daughter and other family members after being sealed for decades. In the records of "Monologues of Emperor Showa", Emperor Hirohito's own conversations with his relatives can actually prove that Emperor Hirohito of Japan was not without power or did not participate in the war. This is also the irrefutable and most powerful evidence.

Because, according to the records in Emperor Showa's Monologue, Emperor Hirohito of Japan said in the section about the "Shanghai Incident", that is, the first Battle of Shanghai, regarding the armistice: "It was General Shirakawa Yoshinori's credit that the battle area in Shanghai was controlled to such an extent and the incident was prevented from escalating. The March armistice was not due to an imperial order, but because I specifically ordered Shirakawa not to escalate the incident."

What Emperor Hirohito of Japan meant here when he said it was not "an imperial order" was not what he signed according to the order drafted by the military order department. It can be seen here that the emperor not only does not have to wait for "advisers" or "act according to the law", but can also transcend the system, and in fact he did.

In the section "The China Incident and the Tripartite Alliance", it also talked about the issue of sending reinforcements to Shanghai during the Second Battle of Shanghai. At that time, Ishiwara Kanji, the first chief of the Japanese Imperial General Staff, believed that dealing with the safety of the Soviet Union and "Manchukuo" was Japan's current priority, so he opposed the Japanese army expanding the war in Shanghai. This view was fiercely opposed by the pro-war faction of the Japanese army, and eventually Ishiwara Kanji had to resign. The Japanese army continued to send reinforcements to Shanghai, making the battle bigger and bigger. From the records of this section in "The Monologue of Emperor Showa", we can see that the increase of troops in Shanghai, China was initiated by Japanese Emperor Hirohito.

In the section on the "Nomonhan Incident", Emperor Hirohito of Japan said: "Because the Soviet-Manchurian border (correctly speaking, the Manchurian-Mongolian border) in Nomonhan was unclear, both sides could say that the other side was illegally invading. At that time, I had ordered the commander of the Kwantung Army, Kenkichi Yamadera, to strictly guard the Manchurian border. Therefore, the Kwantung Army had reason to fight the invading Soviet Army. At the same time, from the standpoint of the Japan-Manchuria Mutual Defense Agreement, it was also legitimate for the Manchurian Army to participate in the battle." It can also be seen from here that all of this was ordered by Emperor Hirohito of Japan.

In the section "Affairs of the Abe Cabinet", Japan's Emperor Hirohito said that because the now rumored candidate for "Military Minister" is not suitable, "I order Abe to appoint Umezu Yoshijiro or Aide-de-camp Nagata Shunroku as Army Minister."

In the section "The Yonai Cabinet and the Military", Emperor Hirohito of Japan said: "In order to suppress the Japan-Germany alliance, I appointed Yonai as Prime Minister. While granting Yonai the order, I also called Hata Shunroku and asked him to support Yonai."

In the section "Dispatching Envoys to the Vatican", Japanese Emperor Hirohito said that it was "my idea" to send an envoy to the Vatican for the first time after the war.

In some matters, although Emperor Hirohito of Japan did not take an active attitude, he was not powerless. In the section of "Tripartite Alliance", Emperor Hirohito of Japan said that Matsuoka Yosuke believed that the United States would not participate in the war, so Emperor Hirohito of Japan agreed to the Japan-Germany Alliance with doubts.

The cabinet formation situation before the war between Japan and the United States was also very similar. In the section "Konoe's resignation and Tojo's cabinet formation", Emperor Hirohito of Japan said that the army originally recommended Konoe Fumimaro as prime minister, but Emperor Hirohito of Japan felt that if such an appointment was made, the Japanese royal family would be responsible for the war. Therefore, Emperor Hirohito of Japan did not agree to Konoe Fumimaro as prime minister, but appointed Tojo Hideki to form a cabinet.

Therefore, it is not that Japan's Emperor Hirohito is powerless, he is just unwilling to take responsibility. Japan's Emperor Hirohito's negative attitude on many occasions is actually based on such calculations of interests. In the section "The Decision to Start a War", Japan's Emperor Hirohito's doubts about starting a war are mainly concerned about whether he can win.

Although Hideki Tojo did have great power, even so, he was just a minister under the emperor. Emperor Hirohito of Japan said in "The Internal Affairs of the Tojo Cabinet", "I want to talk about why the Tojo Cabinet fell? Why didn't I bring it down?"